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The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business reports 
have been ranking countries since 2006. However, do 
improvements in rankings generate greater foreign direct 
investment inflows? This study is the first to test such a 
proposition empirically with Arellano-Bond dynamic 
panel estimators using the official rankings from 2006 
to 2009. The paper shows this relationship is significant 
for the average country. However, when the sample is 
restricted to developing countries, the results suggest 
an improved ranking has, on average, an insignificant 
(albeit positive) influence on foreign direct investment 
This paper is a product of the Pacific: Sydney Unit, International Finance Corporation. It is part of a larger effort by the 
World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at djayasuriya@ifc.org.
inflows. Although robust, this result should be taken 
with caution given that it refers to the average developing 
country using data across a four-year time period. Finally, 
the paper demonstrates that, on average, countries that 
undertake large-scale reforms relative to other countries 
do not necessarily attract greater foreign direct investment 
inflows. This analysis may have important ramifications 
for developing country governments wanting to improve 
their Doing Business Rankings in the hope of attracting 
foreign direct investment inflows.Improvements in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rankings: Do they Translate 
into Greater Foreign Direct Investment Inflows? 
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1. Introduction 
A large body of literature argues that foreign direct investment (FDI) promotes economic growth (Adams 
2009, Alfaro 2000, Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee 1998 and Basu and Guariglia 2007).  Alfaro (2003:1) 
contends it can “be a source of valuable technology ... which can help jump start an economy” while 
Wacziarg (2001) suggests FDI perpetuates trade benefits which then promote economic growth. 
Some even argue FDI is important for alleviating poverty.  Tambula (2004) states increased tax revenues 
from FDI results in poverty reduction, Gohou and Soumare (2011) find FDI has more impacts on welfare 
in poorer countries than wealthier countries while Mahmoud (2010) claims FDI has been a key source of 
employment for women in developing countries.  Masron and Abdullah (2010:115) notes “Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is strongly believed to have a major role to play in the economic development of 
emerging markets”. 
How then can countries improve their FDI inflows?  Since 2004, the World Bank Group has published 
data on the Ease of Doing Business in selected countries while in 2006 it has started ranking countries 
according to their Ease of Doing Business.  Although the World Bank does not argue that improvements 
in the rankings attract FDI, the rankings have a signalling effect with governments, institutions and 
media.  For example, a newspaper article quotes the International Monetary Fund Representative for Sri 
Lanka and the Maldives claiming Sri Lanka requires a higher ranking than India to attract FDI Inflows 
(Jayasinghe 2011) while another states “Kenya has dropped three positions in the World Bank’s ranking 
for ease of doing business handing other east African peers an upper hand in the battle for attracting 
foreign direct investments” (Omondi 2011).  Despite such claims, there appears to be no rigorous panel 
study investigating whether improvements in the official rankings improve FDI inflows.  
This paper uses a panel data set of approximately 84 countries from 2006 to 2009 to show on average, 
improvements in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rankings (forthwith referred to as the Doing 
Business Rankings) do significantly improve FDI inflows.  However, countries undertaking relatively more 
reforms as proxied by large improvements in the Doing Business rankings do not significantly attract 
greater  FDI  inflows  than  other  countries.    Further,  when  restricting  the  sample  to  56  developing 
countries, the relationship between improvements in rankings and FDI inflows is insignificant. 
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the determinants of FDI, section 3 explains the 
data and methodology used in the analysis, section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Determinants of FDI 
Different researchers propose different models and variables when investigating the determinants of 
FDI (see for example Bergstrand and Egger 2007, Stein and Daude 2007 and Walsh and Yu 2010).  Clearly 
the inclusion or exclusion of certain variables could materially influence the results of the analysis.  As 
such, this paper considers various combinations of institutional variables and the key macroeconomic 3 
 
variables of GDP growth, GDP per capita, the real exchange rate, inflation, openness and taxes that are 
generally accepted as likely to influence FDI inflows. 
Researchers  consistently  use  GDP,  GDP  growth,  GDP  per  capita  and/or  other  variants  of  GDP  as 
determinants of FDI (Blonigen 2011, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sayek 2009, Di Giovanni 2005 and 
Head and Ries 2008).  Intuitively this appears reasonable.  For example, high GDP growth may suggest 
large economies of scale (Dhakal, Rahman and Upadhyaya 2007) while high GDP per capita may indicate 
large market size (Walsh and Yu 2010) – both of which are attractive to FDI.   
Real exchange rate valuation is also considered to influence FDI Inflows (Blonegen 2005).  Blonegen 
(2005)  explains  that  foreign  firms  may  take  advantage  of  a  favorable  exchange  rate  to  purchase 
relatively cheaper goods in a host country while Froot and Stein (1991) and Klein and Rosengren (1994) 
empirically show that currency depreciation encourages FDI inflows.  
Controlling for inflation is also an important factor.  If a host country’s currency is inflating at a high rate, 
then any profits generated in that country would be worth less to the parent country.  Walsh and Yu 
(2010) use inflation in their analysis of FDI inflows. 
The influence of taxes in encouraging or discouraging FDI Inflows is dependent on the type of tax.  For 
example, whether countries have a double taxation policy in place (Scholes and Wolfson 1990) and 
differences in corporate income taxes and indirect business taxes (Desai, Foley and Hines 2001) could 
have unique influences on FDI Inflows.  As the influence of tax rates on FDI inflows are uncertain, this 
paper will separately consider the impacts of tax on corporate profits as a percentage of revenues and 
tax on international trade as a percentage of revenues on FDI inflows.  Regression analysis using no tax 
will also be considered. 
A country’s openness, defined as the percentage of imports and exports over GDP, may also influence 
FDI Inflows.  Moreover, FDI may be attracted to countries with greater propensity to trade.  Marson and 
Abdhulla (2010) find a positive significant relationship between openness and FDI Inflows in ASEAN 
countries while Walsh and Yu (2010) find no significant relationship between openness and FDI as a 
share of GDP in a sample of emerging market and developing countries. 
Finally, the quality of a country’s institutions is incorporated into the analysis.  Literature considers this 
to include areas such as labor flexibility, infrastructure quality, financial depth, judicial independence, 
legal  system  efficiency,  corruption  control,  political  stability  and  absence  of  violence,  government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. Some papers suggest strong private property rights and legal rights 
encourage  FDI  Inflows  (Knack  and  Keefer  1995,  Kostevc,  Redek  and  Susjan  2007  and  Masron  and 
Abdhulla 2010) while others find no or little correlation between a country’s institutions and FDI inflow 
(Stein and Daude 2007, Walsh and Yu 2010 and Ghosh 2007). 
This paper considers the Doing Business Rankings, which ranks countries according to their Ease of 
Doing Business, as an institutional variable.  For robustness purposes, it separately considers relevant 
components of the rankings including ease of starting a business, registering property, getting credit, 
protecting  investors,  paying  taxes,  trading  across  borders  and  enforcing  contracts.    As  additional 4 
 
institutional  variables,  this  paper  also  includes  the  World  Bank’s  Governance  Indicators  (forthwith 
referred  to  as  Governance  Indicators)  which  rank  political  stability  and  absence  from  violence, 
corruption  control,  voice  and  accountability,  regulatory  quality,  rule  of  law  and  government.    An 
aggregate World Bank Governance Ranking, based on a simple average of the component indicators, is 
also included in some regressions.  Different combinations of the Doing Business Rankings/components 
and  the  Governance  Indicators  are  used  to  ensure  robustness  of  results  and  counter  possible 
multicollinearity.    For  example,  arguably  the  Governance  Indicators  of  government  effectiveness, 
regulatory quality and rule of law are captured within the Doing Business components of starting a 
business and enforcing contracts – any correlation should be addressed in regression analysis. 
Literature has extensively used the Doing Business Rankings and corresponding components in analysis 
(the World Bank Doing Business website lists more than 100 academic papers).  Eifert (2009) focuses on 
individual components of the Doing Business Rankings and find improvements in the time taken to 
enforce contracts stimulates growth.  However, Eifert (2009) fails to consider the aggregate impacts of 
all the Doing Business components.  Conversely, Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho (2006) do focus on 
aggregate impacts using cross-sectional analysis with fixed country effects.  They show countries with a 
higher Doing Business Ranking in 2004 significantly influences growth.  Surprisingly, Djankov et al. (2006) 
use  as  their  dependent  variable,  the  average  GDP  growth  from  1993  to  2002  and  estimate  Doing 
Business Rankings using 2004 data (official rankings were not available until 2006).  This approach could 
bias results as country rankings change over time and different results would be recorded when using 
data from alternative years.   
Busse and Groizard (2008) use a separate set of fixed country effects when undertaking their cross-
sectional analysis on the influences of selected components of the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
measures on GDP growth.  Like Djankov et al. (2006), they also artificially create a rankings system but 
do so by creating a dummy variable of the 20 most regulated economies.  They find countries with lower 
levels of regulation are more likely to stimulate growth.  While the results are encouraging, the creation 
of a dummy variable reduces the richness of the data available for analysis and the authors do not 
disaggregate between developed and developing countries.   
This paper expands on Busse and Groizard (2008), Djankov et al. (2006) and Eifert (2009) by using a 
more robust panel data set as opposed to cross-sectional analysis, considering the aggregate impact of 
reforms (as captured by the official World Bank rankings as opposed to artificially creating rankings), 
disaggregating impacts to developing countries and focusing specifically on the impact of Doing Business 
reforms on FDI inflows as opposed to the impacts on GDP growth. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The  study  estimates  the  influence  of  the  Doing  Business  Rankings  (DBR),  across  approximately  84 
countries, using data from the period when rankings officially began in 2006 to 2009.  While there were 
175 countries ranked in 2006, the number used in regression  analysis varies due to the use of an 
unbalanced panel.  The 2006 and 2007 rankings were gathered from the 2007 Doing Business report, the 5 
 
2008 rankings from the 2008 Doing Business report and the 2009 rankings from the 2009 Doing Business 
report.  Important to note is between 2006 and 2009, an extra 6 countries were added to the rankings.  
These 6 countries were not included in the preceding analysis with the remaining countries re-ranked 
under the assumption that only the 175 countries, available in 2006, existed.  This approach does not 
materially change any results.  Some regressions, that do not include the Doing Business Rankings, will 
be undertaken using data from 2004 to 2009. 
Recall the Doing Business Rankings are determined by various components.  These, determinants were 
sourced directly from the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business website.  The following table summarizes 
the components of the Ease of Doing Business and the corresponding indicators used in this paper.  
 
Other indicators were not included due to limited perceived relevance (eg: closing a business) and due 
to potential multicollinearity (eg: time to start a business was selected over number of procedures 
required to start a business). 
Determinants  of  governance  were  sourced  from  the  World  Bank’s  Governance  Indicators  website.  
These  include  political  stability  and  absence  from  violence  (PV),  corruption  control  (CC),  voice  and 
accountability (VA), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL) and government effectiveness (GE).  
GDP  growth  data  (GDPGR),  GDP  per  capita  (GDPCAP),  Openness  (OPEN),  FDI  inflow  data 
(FDI_INF_Norm), the real exchange rate (REER), inflation rate (INF), the tax on corporate profits as a 
percentage  of  revenues  (TAXPROFIT)  and  tax  on  international  trade  as  a  percentage  of  revenues 
(TAXINT) were sourced from the World Bank’s Development Indicators.   
Any panel analysis with FDI inflows as the dependent variable would require instrumenting GDP growth, 
GDP per capita, the real exchange rate and openness given potential reverse causality between these 
endogenous  variables.    Further,  it  would  have  to  instrument  the  exogenous  variables  while  also 
considering country fixed effects (such as geographic location) that are unlikely to change significantly 
over the short time period in question.   
As such, this paper follows a similar recent study undertaken on FDI flows (Walsh and Yu 2010) and uses 
the Arellano-Bond methodology that accounts for fixed effects in large cross-sectional and small time 
series panels.  A gravity model (Dabla-Norris, Honda, Lahreche and Verdier 2010) was not used as it 
Selected Components Selected Indicators Acronym
Time (days) SBT
Cost (% of income per capita) SBC
Time (days) RPT
Cost (% of income per capita) RPC
Protecting Investors Strength of investor protection index (0-10) IPS
Paying Taxes Payments (number per year) TPN
Time to export (days) XT
Cost to export (US$ per container) XC
Time to import (days) IT
Cost to import (US$ per container) IC
Time (days) ECT
Cost (% of claim) ECC
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focuses on bilateral trade flows, usually from developed countries to developing countries.  Moreover, 
similar gravity models would ignore large FDI outflows emanating from emerging economies such as 
China and India. 
For this paper, the following model is regressed: 
                          
                                      (1) 
where   represents FDI inflows,   represents a vector of macroeconomic variables,   represents the 
variable(s)  of  interest  (Doing  Business  Ranking  as  per  Table  2,  components  of  the  Doing  Business 
Rankings as per Table 4 or Doing Business Rankings restricted to Developing Countries as per Table 5), 
  represents the Governance Indicators or an artificially created World Bank Governance Rank and   
represents the country-fixed effects.   Different macroeconomic variables and combinations of the Doing 
Business Rankings/Indicators and Governance Indicators are used to test the robustness of results and 
counter possible multicollinearity.  The model is also separately estimated with an additional 2009 time 
dummy variable as the financial crisis would likely have reduced FDI inflows.   
Further, Klapper and Love (2010) produce models using a dummy variable to denote countries that have 
undertaken  significant  reforms.    Similarly,  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  the  DBR  variable  from 
equation (1) is replaced with a dummy for countries that have improved by greater than 9 places on the 
Doing Business Rankings from 2006 to 2007, 2007 to 2008 and 2008 to 2009 (D09).  Separate analysis is 
also  undertaken  replacing  the  DBR  variable  with  a  dummy  denoting  countries  that  have  improved 
greater than 4 places on the Doing Business Rankings (D04).  This is important given that Klapper and 
Love (2010) find countries making broader reforms have greater impact on new firm registration.  The 
analysis  incorporating  reform  dummies  would  show  whether  the  Klapper  and  Love  (2010)  finding 
translates into FDI Inflows; i.e. whether countries making greater reforms (as denoted by large increases 
in the Doing Business Rankings) are more likely to generate greater FDI inflows. 
To remove the fixed effects from equation (1), a difference-in-difference approach is used such that the 
following equation is regressed: 
                                            (2) 
To remove the problem of serial correlation between the error term and the dependent variable and 
ensure strong instruments are used, the first lagged level and lagged differences of the endogenous 
variables and exogenous variables are used as instruments as per the system GMM approach (Blundell 
and Bond 1998).  The instruments used are stronger than those available under a traditional two-
squares least squares approach and thus makes the results more efficient (Roodman 2009) while the 
system GMM approach also allows observation from t-1 to be included in the analysis.  The endogenous 
lags are restricted to one time period (both the first and second lags are regressed separately to ensure 
validity of results) to reduce the number of instruments and improve the prospects that the p-value for 
the Hansen J test, which tests the null of joint validity of all instruments, is between 0.1 and 0.25.   If the 
p-value from the test is greater than 0.25, it may imply that too many instruments have been used 
which produces standard errors that are downward biased (Roodman 2009).  Finally, robust standard 7 
 




Table 2 shows the Doing Business Ranking indicator is significant under multiple specifications.  This 
implies on average, an increase in the Doing Business Rankings significantly increases FDI inflows by 
approximately 300 million USD.  Note, as the lowest ranking is 175 and the highest ranking is 1, a 
negative coefficient of the DBR variable in the tables implies an improvement in rankings.  The same 
levels  of  significance  hold  when  using  the  first  lag  or  the  second  lag  of  endogenous  variables  as 
instruments.   
Table 2, columns D and E, which include tax variables, do not appear to be the strongest models given 
the insignificance of the GDP growth variable and the high p-value for the Hansen J test.  Further, the 
model regressed in Column I also appears inappropriate given the significant p-value for the Hansen J 
test.  Column F, which omits GDP per Capita in its analysis, is the only appropriate model suggesting on 
average,  improvements  in  a  governance  variable,  corruption  control,  positively  and  significantly 
influences FDI Inflows. As opposed to the Doing Business Rankings, a higher numerical number for the 
World Bank’s Governance Rankings represents a higher ranking than a lower numerical number.   
When including a time dummy for 2009 the DBR variable in Column A loses significance, albeit only 
slightly (p-value 0.108).  The DBR variable across all other specifications remains significant while the 
magnitude of the DBR coefficients remain approximately the same.  When removing the 2009 data 
altogether none of the DBR variables in Table 1 lose significance while the coefficients of the DBR 
variable become greater in absolute magnitude.   
Table 3 illustrates that in most cases D09 reform dummies are insignificant when replacing the DBR 
variable in equation (1).  Note the p-value for the Hansen J test is most appropriate in Columns A and I.  
This result holds when undertaking regressions using the D04 dummies in place of the D09 dummies and 
when  including  dummies  for  2009.    Hence  it  appears  the  Klapper  and  Love  (2010)  result  on  the 
significant  influence  of  large  scale  reforms  on  increasing  firm  registration  does  not  translate  to 
increasing FDI inflows. 
Table  4  shows  the  results  when  regressing  relevant  indicators  of  the  Doing  Business  Rankings  (as 
opposed to the Doing Business Rankings themselves).  It shows that in at least 3 out of 5 models, on 
average, reductions in the time and cost taken to enforce contracts is significantly correlated with higher 
FDI Inflows.  Note, the models captured in Columns C and D appear to be mis-specified as the variable 
XC, which relates to the cost of exports, is positive when a-priori it would be expected that reductions in 
the cost of exports would improve FDI Inflows and not vice versa.  The regression in Column E also has a 
high Hansen J test p-value of 0.39 which may imply this is not an appropriate model (although the 
Hansen J test p-value reduces to a reasonable 0.16 when using the second lag instead of the first lag for 
endogenous variable instrumenting purposes).   8 
 
Table 5 illustrates the results when focusing on developing countries in isolation (data is available for 
approximately 56 countries).  It notes while there is a favorable relationship between improvements in 
the Doing Business Rankings and FDI, the relationship is insignificant.  The coefficients are also smaller 
than the case when including all countries in the analysis (i.e. results from Table 2).  This heterogeneity 
in results between developing countries and all countries may provoke deeper analysis by researchers 
who do not distinguish between developing and developed countries when estimating the impacts of 
Ease of Doing Business indicators (Busse and Groizard 2008 and Djankov et al. 2006).  Including a time 
dummy for 2009 does not increase the significance of the DBR variable while reform dummies are also 
insignificant when replacing the DBR variable. 
Why  is there  an  insignificant  correlation  between  the  Doing  Business  Rankings  and  FDI  Inflows  for 
developing countries?  One reason could be improvements in Doing Business rankings, which represents 
the formal time and costs involved with fully complying with regulations, may not necessarily translate 
to the actual experiences of a wide range of firms.  Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2011) show there 
is a disconnect between policy and policy implementation; they note that reduction in Doing Business 
days for compliance is likely accompanied by increases in actual days for compliance across a survey of 
firms.    This  discrepancy  “could  reflect  greater  enforcement  or  compliance”  after  the  policy  is 
implemented (Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett 2011:6). 
Does  this  imply  developing  country  governments  should  focus  on  compliance  and  ignore  making 
improvements in Ease of Doing Business altogether when trying to attract FDI?  Not necessarily.  It is 
important to note the results of this paper apply for the average developing country using data across a 
sample of 56 developing countries.  Moreover one individual country may reap strong benefits from FDI 
inflows as a result of improvements in the Doing Business Rankings.  A longer time period with richer 
data will help answer this question for individual countries and perhaps provide more opportunity for 
changes in the business environment to attract FDI Inflows.   
Do the overall results suggest governments can focus on particular institutional areas to attract FDI 
inflows?  Perhaps improvements in the time taken and cost to enforce contracts may assist in this 
endeavor.  However if governments simply focus on this area and neglect others, their Doing Business 
Rankings  will  slip.    Thus,  the  Eifert  (2009)  model  could  be  mis-specified  as  it  fails  to  consider  the 
aggregate impact of reforms.  Moreover, as shown in Table 2, the improvements in the Doing Business 
Rankings  are  likely  to  positively  influence  FDI  inflows.    Hence  rather  than  focusing  on  enforcing 
contracts,  it  is  possible  improvements  in  the  average  country’s  Doing  Business  Ranking  present  a 
signalling  effect to  external  investors  that  its  business  environment  is  becoming  more  favorable  to 
foreign  investment.  This  hypothesis  is  given  stronger  credence  by  the  fact  that  Aghion,  Philippe, 
Blundell,  Griffith  Howitt  and  Prantl  (2008)  and  Kaplan,  Piedra,  and  Seira  (2007)  suggest  that  a 
combination  of  reforms  has  greater  impact  than  business  entry  reforms  in  isolation.  However,  it 
contradicts the approach used by Busse and Groizard (2008) that only selects Doing Business indicators 




Using panel data of approximately 84 countries from 2006 to 2009, this paper is the first to show 
empirically that for the average country, improvement in the official Doing Business Rankings is likely to 
increase FDI into a country.  While improvements in some determinants of the Doing Business Ranking 
are  indeed  correlated  with  greater  FDI  inflows,  it  is  perhaps  improvements  in  the  Doing  Business 
Rankings of the average country that act as a strong signalling effect to investors.  Nevertheless, there 
appears to be no evidence to suggest large improvements in Doing Business Rankings (i.e. ‘reform’ 
countries) attract significantly greater FDI inflows. 
When focusing on developing countries in isolation, the relationship is insignificant.  This result should 
be taken with caution given it refers to the average developing country across a four year time period.  A 
more complete picture of the influence of Doing Business Rankings on FDI inflows may be available as 
more data becomes available. 
As countries are not homogenous, it would be interesting to note how improvements in the Doing 
Business Rankings influence FDI inflows into countries of different economic sizes.  For example, would 
improvements in the Doing Business Rankings for smaller economies such as those in the Pacific Island 
countries lead to greater FDI inflows or is this correlation stronger among larger economies such as 
India,  Vietnam  or  Brazil?    Similarly,  analysis  could  be  undertaken  across  geographical  areas.    Are 
investors more likely to favor African countries relative to Asian countries given similar changes in the 
Doing Business Rankings or would their focus largely be on Europe or the Americas?  Again, as more 
data become available, researchers and policy makers should be able to investigate the answers to 
these questions.   This may also encourage, or discourage, governments to improve their Doing Business 
Rankings. 
Finally the relationship between improvements in the Doing Business Rankings and GDP growth using 





Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F Column G Column H Column I Column J
DBR -2.50* -2.64* -2.97** -2.29 -2.57 -3.19* -3.94** -4.22** -2.53**
1.48 1.48 1.49 1.62 2.02 1.66 1.42 1.57 0.85
GDPGR 9.77** 7.81** 9.21** 4.36 0.92 9.65** 6.61** 9.79** 6.34** 1.97
3.86 3.52 3.72 4.26 5.39 4.23 3.25 4.19 2.65 2.05
GDPCAP 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.02** 0.01**
0 0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
REER 3.01 3.22 2.73 4.01 5.36 4.41* 0.07 3.08 0.43 0.03
2.53 2.5 2.61 3.05 3.96 2.38 0.41 2.41 1.96 1.89
INF -1.89 -0.56 -2.44 -1.20 -1.39 -2.68 -4.83 -3.37 2.97
4.43 4.59 4.26 5.26 6.52 3.99 3.69 2.82 2.53
OPEN -6.18 -6.03 -6.15 -4.49 -7.38 -6.26 -5.88 -6.28 -2.52





VA -6.55* -7.02 -13.32** -5.30 -4.08
3.96 5.31 6.53 4.05 4.38
PV 0.92 1.19 6.60* 1.07 -1.03
2.54 3.27 3.99 2.90 2.86
CC 3.78 5.48 3.39 5.98* -0.97









Hansen J test 0.19 0.37 0.25 0.52 0.63 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.19
No. of observations 323 323 323 216 182 323 331 323 340 511
No. of groups 84 84 84 61 53 84 85 84 86 89
No. of instruments 43 46 44 47 47 38 35 35 27 58
Standard errors corrected for robustness in italics.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, * Significance at the 10 percent level.
GMM based on the Arellano-Bond methodology
Dependent Variable: Value of FDI Inflows (100s of million USD)
Table 2 - Influence of Doing Business Rankings on FDI Inflows into Developed and Developing Countries
A negative coefficient for the DBR variable suggests on average, an increase in the Doing Business Ranking will increase FDI Inflows all else constant (i.e. higher rankings are a lower numerical 
value).  For the remaining variables, the opposite is true; an increase in that variable suggests, on average, an increase in FDI Inflows all else constant.11 
 
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F Column G Column H Column I
REFORMS 122.77 106.06 130.10* 98.41 42.03 106.76 88.29 117.30* 103.02
76.26 71.36 78.34 88.13 104.49 72.02 71.64 69.54 65.2
GDPGR 5.38 3.28 4.51 3.41 -1.37 7.81** -3.71 0.03 0.72
3.54 3.46 3.48 4.6 5.6 3.33 4.54 4.04 3.53
GDPCAP 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.02**
0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
REER 0.97 0.95 0.43 3.38 5.55 1.28 -0.56 -3.18 -2.95
2.19 2.14 2.25 3.05 4.06 1.74 0.77 3.27 2.7
INF -1.87 -1.59 -2.76 -0.36 0.83 -7.27* -14.23** -15.66**
5.2 5.03 5.04 6.19 6.83 3.94 5.87 5.04
OPEN -3.24 -2.81 -3.24 -2.58 -6.69 0.8 2.17 1.9
3.06 3.17 3.07 3.16 4.24 3.27 2.64 2.58
VA -3.88 -5.47 -12.28* 2.37
4.03 7.01 6.97 3.61
PV -1.16 0.08 5.59 -4.23*
2.42 3.87 3.67 2.36
CC 2.39 2.31 4.7 5.36







Hansen J test 0.24 0.33 0.31 0.48 0.49 0.34 0.52 0.45 0.14
No. of observations 248 248 248 163 136 248 254 248 264
No. of groups 88 88 88 63 54 88 89 88 90
No. of instruments 38 41 39 42 42 34 30 31 24
Standard errors corrected for robustness in italics.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, * Significance at the 10 percent level.
Dependent Variable: Value of FDI Inflows (100s of million USD)
GMM based on the Arellano-Bond methodology
A negative coefficient for the DBR variable suggests on average, an increase in the Doing Business Ranking will increase FDI Inflows all else constant (i.e. higher 
rankings are a lower numerical value).  For the remaining variables, the opposite is true; an increase in that variable suggests, on average, an increase in FDI 
Inflows all else constant.
REFORM represents a dummy for countries that have improved by greater than 9 places on the Doing Business Rankings from 2006 to 2007, 2007 to 2008 and 
2008 to 2009 (D09)
 Table 3 - Influence of Large Doing Business Rankings Improvements (greater than 9 ranking places) on FDI Inflows into Developed and Developing Countries12 
 
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E
SBT 1.94 1.33 1.33 1.5 1.62
1.71 1.72 1.83 1.52 1.85
SBC 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.04
0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08
RPT 0.16 0.15 0.03 0 0.22
0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25
RPC 5.45 3.48 1.41 1.74 3.31
6.47 6.45 5.23 5.83 5.46
IPA 45.15 54.27 30.75 39.94 48.71
41.72 41.56 46.31 44.49 43.71
TPN -0.35 -0.83 -2.57* -2.84** -0.73
1.41 1.26 1.38 1.41 1.2
XT 2.59 3.59 -7.77 -9.45 3.9
6.48 6.7 5.38 5.94 5.56
XC 0.02 -0.02 0.17** 0.18** -0.02
0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08
IM -5.2 -8.12* -3.77 -4.64 -8.36*
4.06 4.76 4.25 4.25 4.6
IC 0 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.06
0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07
ECT -0.29 -0.29* -0.40** -0.42** -0.26*
0.18 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.14
ECC -1.55 -2.06* -1.89* -2.32* -1.44
1.17 1.19 1.02 1.24 0.95
GDPGR 7.84 8.26* 11.48** 11.75** 6.38
4.97 4.72 4.22 4.81 3.93
GDPCAP 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
0.01 0.01 0.01
REER 1.7 0.99 1.81 1.33 0.62
2.78 2.85 2.15 2.43 2.65
INF 1.89 1.84 0.62 1.81 2.5
4.61 4.64 4.19 3.96 4.86
OPEN -5.03 -4.91 -3.04 -4.07 -3.98









Hansen J test 0.23 0.40 0.13 0.14 0.39
No. of observation 327 327 327 327 327
No. of groups 86 86 86 86 86
No. of instruments 54 55 49 46 57
Standard errors corrected for robustness in italics.
A negative coefficient for the first 11 variables suggests on average, an increase in that variable will increase FDI 
Inflows all else constant (i.e. higher rankings are a lower numerical value).  For the remaining variables, the 
opposite is true; an increase in that variable suggests, on average, an increase in FDI Inflows all else constant.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, * Significance at the 10 percent 
level.
Dependent Variable: Value of FDI Inflows (100s of million USD)
GMM based on the Arellano-Bond methodology
Table 4 - Influence of Components of the Doing Business Rankings on FDI Inflows into Developed and 
Developing Countries13 
 
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F Column G Column H Column I
DBR -1.47 -1.37 -1.07 -0.58 -0.6 -1.48 -1.81 -1.91 -0.36*
1.01 1.01 0.9 1.07 0.95 1.09 1.25 1.23 0.19
GDPGR 11.68 10.56 11.99 9.49 8.41 12.01 8.56 12.74 11.03
8.64 7.01 8.84 7.01 6.47 7.32 6.35 8.77 9.11
GDPCAP 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.01* 0.01*
0 0 0 0 0
REER 2.99 3.02 3.16 3 3.26 3.47 -0.1 3.25 2.88
2.91 2.65 2.97 3.19 3.41 2.71 0.26 2.94 2.83
INF -8.1 -4.83 -8 -3.1 -2.62 -5.56 -8.64 -5.62
6.61 4.02 6.58 4.02 3.68 4.03 6.34 5.17
OPEN -4.16 -4.31* -4.09 -4.42 -3.49 -4.93* -4.6 -4.92
2.81 2.61 2.74 3.17 2.62 2.84 3.57 3.31
VA -3.46 -6.32 -6.19 -3.26
2.69 4.71 4.8 2.67
PV 2.43 5.71 4.88 2.81
2.01 4.32 3.86 2.16
CC 1.5 0.59 0.96 1.79







Hansen J test 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.93 0.75 0.19 0.26 0.15 0.01
No. of observations 218 218 218 125 129 218 226 218 232
No. of groups 57 57 57 36 38 57 58 57 59
No. of instruments 43 46 44 47 47 38 34 35 27
Standard errors corrected for robustness in italics.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, * Significance at the 10 percent level.
Table 5 - Influence of Doing Business Rankings on FDI Inflows to Developing Countries
Dependent Variable: Value of FDI Inflows (100s of million USD)
GMM based on the Arellano-Bond methodology
A negative coefficient for the DBR variable suggests on average, an increase in the Doing Business Ranking will increase FDI Inflows all else constant (i.e. higher 
rankings are a lower numerical value).  For the remaining variables, the opposite is true; an increase in that variable suggests, on average, an increase in FDI 
Inflows all else constant.14 
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